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Would Brown make it to New York City?
The First Phase of the Battle for Public School Integration, 1954-1957

When Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren handed down the Brown decision on May 17,
1954 declaring the doctrine of “separate but equal” unconstitutional, the ruling sent shockwaves
around the world. The far-reaching implications of the decision were not lost on anyone as
opinions on the Brown mandate included a wide spectrum of viewpoints. Across the South,
whether in Jackson, Mississippi—a bastion of racial intolerance1—or Greensboro, North
Carolina—a city that had a reputation for moderation in racial matters2—, white public opinion
in the immediate aftermath of the decision ran the gamut from unequivocal defiance to calls for
compliance. Southern white public opinion had not hardened against the Brown decision in the
middle of 1954 the way that it eventually would by 1957.
While white communities in various places showed a range of reactions to the mandate,
black communities were no more monolithic. In Atlanta “there were no street celebrations in
Negro communities.” In fact, students at Spelman College questioned what effect the decision
would have on historically black colleges and universities.3 While the Mississippi branch of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had consistently
opposed segregation, black principals and teachers were more ambivalent about the decision.4
Blacks and whites alike were anxious about how the future would be different now.
Concern not only imbedded itself in the national consciousness below the Mason-Dixon line.
Northern cities and school boards were also forced to evaluate the extent to which they would
have to change their institutional policies in order to comply with Brown.
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The changes wrought on the North by that fateful May 17, 1954 ruling—both as a region
and in specific northern cities—are not often addressed in general studies of the modern civil
rights movement. Traditionally, the fight for equal rights during the 1950s and 1960s has been
conceptualized as a southern phenomenon that began to have relevance for the North (and West)
only after 1965, with the emergence of black power ideology and the move away from the tactics
of non-violent direct action. However, understanding how events in the North dovetailed with
and diverged from what was happening in the South is critical to more fully understanding the
impact and legacy of the national civil rights struggle. The movement was a nationwide
campaign and shifting the focus of historical study to the North, particularly during the
immediate post-Brown period, alters our understanding of the movement’s trajectory.5 Similar
struggles were taking place in both regions, but within different cultural contexts. In this early
period, the movement was operating from a similar ideological viewpoint in both the North and
the South; racial integration in all social arenas was a positive goal, worthy of pursuing.
After Brown, segregation in the nation’s public schools became the number one topic for
debate, public policy, and protest all over the nation, not only the South. Only weeks after the
decision, noted psychologist Dr. Kenneth Clark once again accused the New York City Board of
Education of “permitting ‘Jim Crow’ practices at some of its schools.”6 Dr. Clark, whose
findings that segregated schools caused inferiority complexes in African American children had
been critical in the Brown case, had condemned Board of Education policies before May of
1954. He argued that the de facto segregation of New York City’s system had been as effective
at “damning up the source of future intellectual functioning” as legal segregation. Black and
Puerto Rican children, chronically unprepared for academic secondary schooling, were left to
blame themselves and their alleged inferiority for their academic underachievement.7 Clark’s
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statement was not only an indictment of the fact that significant integration was not taking place
in the public schools, but also a charge of years of neglect—willful or not—on the part of the
Board toward “ghetto” schools.
The Board just as adamantly denied that there was any legal segregation in the public
schools.8 And it was correct; legal segregation did not exist in New York City’s public schools.
But Clark did have evidence of Board-sanctioned racial segregation. An October 21 New York
Herald-Tribune article uncovered a policy in northern Manhattan where white families were
allowed to send their children to a predominantly white school, PS 169, outside of their district
instead of their zoned school, PS 46, which had a predominantly African American student body.
The Board of Education even provided bus transportation to PS 169 for the white students when
PS 46 was within walking distance to their homes.9
School Superintendent, William Jansen, could not deny that white children were being
bused a mile away from their homes to PS 169.10 So finally in May of 1955, the Board of
Education began to do something about it. Assistant Superintendent, Truda Weil, devised a plan
to gradually eliminate this “permissive zone” by September of 1956.11 Dr. Clark used the
situation in Upper Manhattan to dramatize the larger flaws of the educational system, but he also
hoped that the recently authorized Public Education Association study would do more to
illustrate the need for Board action in favor of integration. The revelation of Board-sanctioned
busing at PS 169 was particularly damning because busing young children out of their immediate
area flew directly in the face of the “neighborhood school” concept that the Board held so dear.
The Board believed it desirable for children to attend schools closest to their homes—
particularly in the elementary grades. Officials contended that “neighborhood schools”
promoted safety and familiarity because children would be attending school in the areas and with
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the people they knew best. However, the neighborhood school concept was at odds with
integration because residential patterns in the city were such that most neighborhoods were
racially and ethnically homogeneous. Therefore, schools in many communities tended to be
comprised of a particular racial or ethnic group.
In the wake of the Brown ruling and the repeated critiques of Dr. Clark and others, even
before the busing of white students to PS 169 was exposed, the Board of Education requested
that the Public Education Association (PEA), a private educational research group, conduct a
study of public school education among Negro and Puerto Rican children.12 Rose Shapiro
headed up the study.13 In addition, the Board of Education also established the Commission on
Integration (CI) on December 23, 1954. The Board released a powerful statement of its intent to
comply with Brown when it announced the formation of the special commission.14
Creating the Commission on Integration was an important step towards school
integration. The Board’s policy statement served several purposes. By calling Brown v. Board
of Education a “moral reaffirmation of our fundamental educational principles,” the Board
implied that a tradition of racial and ethnic integration had existed in New York City schools
before 1954.15 The statement also framed the quest for integration as a national rather than
regional problem. And by acknowledging the cruelty of de facto segregation and accepting the
challenge to eliminate it, the Board pledged that it would make every attempt to comply with the
Supreme Court decision. Proponents of integration had to be optimistic about the prospects of
school integration. However, the next few years would show all too clearly that genuine racial
integration required much more than zeal and commission studies. Battles over integrating
schools and providing minority schools with better personnel would end in frustration for civil
rights organizations and black and Puerto Rican parents.
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The Commission on Integration consisted of the nine members of the Board of
Education, five school administrators, and twenty-three civic and educational leaders, including
Ella Baker of the NAACP and Kenneth Clark. After their initial meeting in April 1955, the CI
divided itself into seven sub-commissions in order to study specific aspects of the school system
and report back to the Board with recommendations on how to improve the schools and foster
integration.16
The Public Education Association submitted its independent report on educational
conditions in the public schools in November of 1955. The study found that 71 percent of city
schools were comprised of student populations that were either ninety or more percent white or
ninety or more percent black and Puerto Rican. The PEA study revealed five major findings.
When compared to predominantly white schools, the schools that were overwhelmingly black
and Puerto Rican tended to: 1) be located in older buildings with less than satisfactory floor and
playground spaces; 2) have less tenured faculty members, a higher proportion of probationary
teachers, and higher teacher turnover rates; 3) offer more “classes for retarded children” and
“fewer classes for bright children;” 4) have lower standardized test scores; and 5) have larger
average class sizes for their mainstreamed students.17 All signs indicated that, whether or not the
reasons were calculated in origin, African American and Puerto Rican youth were being deprived
of adequate educations by the New York City school system.
However, the PEA also emphasized, in agreement with Board leaders, that there were
many factors inhibiting integration outside of the Board’s control.18 On November 7, 1955, the
day after the report was approved, the New York Times’ headline read, “City Schools Cleared in
Segregation Study”19 and the New York World Telegram’s headline read, “School Board Cleared
in Segregation Issue: Survey Finds Racial Concentration of Pupils Due to Residence Patterns.”20
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Kenneth Clark, among others, was infuriated by the media’s interpretation that the Board
had been exonerated from responsibility for current conditions in the schools. On November 12
he responded in the press, calling the PEA press release “an attempted whitewash.” “That the
Board of Education has been cleared is a misinterpretation of the report,” and he further charged
that “verbal tricks [had been] used to mislead the public.”21
Although the “whitewash” metaphor was, perhaps, unfortunate, the point was that Board
of Education had indeed been indicted for not providing equal education for all of New York’s
children. Clark refused to let it be lost on anyone that in New York, as cosmopolitan a city as
any in the world, segregation existed in the public schools. Therefore, officials at the Board of
Education and city residents had no more superior claim on enlightenment than their southern
counterparts that openly endorsed segregation. Conditions in the schools, and for blacks and
Puerto Ricans generally in New York, were still not equal with whites.22
For Kenneth Clark, the CI, and other groups such as the Brooklyn NAACP, the struggle
for school integration was not just about black and white children attending classes in the same
building. The more imperative issue was guaranteeing high quality educational programs for all
children, which they all believed could only happen in an integrated setting.23 In the report it
submitted to the Board of Education in the summer of 195624 the CI sub-commission on
“Educational Standards and Curriculum,” which Clark chaired, argued that in order to foster
integration and improve the quality of education for all of New York City’s children, the
educational standards, physical plant, and quality of personnel hired in minority schools would
need to be raised dramatically.25 Disparities in standards and achievement levels between
predominantly minority and predominantly white schools spoke to another fundamental problem
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in the school system: inequalities in educational standards and philosophies toward teaching
students of color that were, at their core, racist.
For the Board to endorse the recommendations from the Commission subcommittees was
one thing, but the Brooklyn NAACP’s Schools Workshop would provide the Board with its first
true test when they challenged the Board to actively work to integrate Junior High School 258
(JHS 258) in the borough’s Bedford-Stuyvesant section. Annie Stein was one of the group’s
principal leaders. She had been a labor organizer and had also served on the Office of Price
Administration price panel during the Second World War. Before her passion for eliminating
racial discrimination and her interest in educational issues led her to join the Brooklyn branch of
the NAACP, she had also been president of the Parent Teacher Association of Junior High
School 246 in Brooklyn.26
Reverend Milton A. Galamison was the other major leader of the Schools Workshop. He
had been the pastor of the Siloam Presbyterian Church since 1948. Galamison was elected chair
of the Brooklyn NAACP’s education committee in December of 1955 and it was in this capacity
during the battle to integrate JHS 258 that he appeared on the local civil rights scene. Over the
next decade Galamison would become one of the most important civil rights activists working
for school integration in New York City.27
The Schools Workshop28 was a mass group that worked through existing parent and
teacher groups to educate parents about issues concerning Brooklyn’s public schools. The
Schools Workshop mobilized support for action through education. Stein believed that the more
parents knew about Board of Education policies, the more involved they would become. In that
way, the Workshop gave Brooklyn parents a vehicle through which to contest Board policies.29
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Galamison, Stein, and the parents of the NAACP Schools Workshop saw the integration
of JHS 258 as essential to demonstrating the Board of Education’s commitment to racial
integration. But as of November 1956, the Board was not keeping its promise to integrate JHS
258. Of nearly 1,100 students, only between 12-15 (or 1 percent) were white.30 The Board had
made different promises to various constituencies. While Superintendent Jansen told civil rights
organizations that the Board would work to integrate JHS 258,31 he also worked to assuage white
parents’ fears by assuring them no “radical” changes would take place within the system.
Galamison claimed that the Board purposefully segregated black and Puerto Rican
students from white students in the same neighborhood by zoning them to different schools. He
advocated that white and black students be redistributed among Bedford-Stuyvesant’s schools
not simply for the purposes of integration, but because he believed this was the only way to
guarantee that the educational standards and facilities would be upgraded to provide minority
children with better educational opportunities.32
Jansen maintained that some progress toward integration had been made, but that massive
racial integration would be virtually impossible because JHS 258 was located in the heart of
Bedford-Stuyvesant, an overwhelmingly black neighborhood.33 It was only in the “fringe”34
areas, not in the black neighborhoods, that Board leaders believed the most substantial
integration could take place. Rather than actively work to integrate JHS 258, Jansen pledged to
provide the school with additional services.35 The Brooklyn NAACP was not satisfied with
Jansen’s response. The branch sent an open letter to Superintendent Jansen saying that any
statements from the Board of Education on progress in integrating JHS 258 were an “attempt to
evade” its responsibility to integrate the school.36
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Jansen, however, stood behind the Board’s concept of the “neighborhood school.” Since
residential patterns were segregated, the neighborhood school concept hindered integration. But
by affirming neighborhood schools, school officials were ideologically at odds with the civil
rights movement. As historian Clarence Taylor writes, “Jansen’s and Silver’s offer [of
additional services] indicated their belief that they could provide black and Puerto Rican children
with a decent education in a segregated setting, thus ignoring Galamison’s assertion of the
urgency to end segregation because children could not properly learn under such conditions.”37
Galamison tried to keep the pressure on the Board to integrate JHS 258 in November of
1956 by going to Mayor Robert Wagner and requesting that he ask for Jansen’s resignation;
informing him that unless something was done to “clean up” the situation at JHS 258, he had
25,000 African Americans ready to vote Republican in the next election. Eight days later the
Board announced that it would study the student population at JHS 258 and attached a resolution
“reaffirm[ing] the Board’s intention to achieve racial integration in the schools.”38 BedfordStuyvesant Assistant Superintendent, Joseph Noethen, reported that hundreds of children in
schools in and around Bedford-Stuyvesant had been shifted in the interest of integration.39
Galamison continued his efforts to make Jansen and the Board of Education accountable
for not acting in the spirit or the letter of Brown v. Board. In February 1957, at a symposium
sponsored by the Americans for Democratic Action, Galamison again questioned the “board’s
willingness to take positive steps to integration.”40 Still in September of 1957 Galamison was
challenging the Board to act affirmatively to integrate JHS 258. Black and Puerto Rican parents
organized a protest asserting that no significant progress had been made in the case of JHS 258
and New York City more generally, but ultimately, this first major test to get the Board to move
to actively integrate a school was unsuccessful.41
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A simultaneous, and equally intense fight was spurred by the efforts to equalize the ratio
of certified to substitute teachers in minority schools. Not only the PEA study, but also the CI
reports cited the disproportionate number of uncertified and substitute teachers in minority
schools as a critical problem that needed to be rectified. At the start of the 1957 school year only
18 teachers out of 70 at JHS 258 had regular licenses. Twenty-two teachers were substitutes and
the remaining thirty came in on waivers from elementary schools.42 Unfortunately, the staff
makeup of JHS 258 was typical of public schools in African American and Puerto Rican
communities. The PEA, CI, and parents organizations such as the United Parents Association all
had suggestions for how to remedy this problem, which usually revolved around teacher rotation.
A report on teacher assignments, prepared by the Commission on Integration in the fall of
1956, was a lightning rod for criticism by teacher groups, including the New York Teachers
Guild (NYTG), the Joint Committee of Teachers Organizations (JCTO), and the High School
Teachers Association (HSTA). All of these organizations had predominantly white membership
rosters, particularly at the highest levels of leadership. And well before programs of voluntary
and compulsory teacher rotation were considered by the Board of Education, these groups had
already created a flurry of opposition.43
The report on Teacher Assignments, presented and approved by the executive committee
of the Commission on December 6, 1956, faced criticism from teachers for several reasons.44
One recommendation requiring three years of service in a “difficult school”45 to be eligible for
promotions prompted the High School Teachers Association to answer back that “promotion
should depend on ‘probable ability to do a job established by meritorious service and open
competition’ and not on ‘willingness to act as a guard for several years.’”46 Apparently, teaching
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in a “difficult”—read “black and Puerto Rican”—school would not only be degrading, but akin
to being a warden in a prison.
Teacher organizations did offer many of the same suggestions as the sub-commission
report on how to staff “difficult schools,” but other recommendations, although perhaps
appearing innocuous, upon closer inspection, smacked of the racism evident in the linkage
between minority schools and penitentiaries. The teachers’ associations asked for a $400 per
year bonus for taking these assignments.47 Another suggestion was to increase the bonus to $480
per year on par with teachers in “600” schools (The “600” schools were for children who were
one step removed from juvenile detention centers and prison).48 Asking for more pay to teach in
these mainstreamed public schools demonstrated that these teachers looked at black and Puerto
Rican children as inherently more difficult to teach than white students. The Board rejected this
request, saying that “a subject school is not a school for delinquents.”49
Teacher groups also recommended that special classes be set up for emotionally disturbed
students. But Kenneth Clark and the staff at the Northside Center proved that schools were,
already, often too quick to place young people of color in classes for children with retarded
mental development (CRMD). Dr. Clark pointed out in 1954 that in Harlem public schools there
were 103 CRMD classes but only six classes for intellectually gifted students.50 According to
Clark, “most stay in their regular classes that ‘meet their ability.’ Little is expected of them, they
are rewarded for mediocre performance, and consequently accomplish increasingly less than
students at their grade level should accomplish.”51 In fact, classes that were supposed to “meet
the ability” of students were often inhibiting in the long run because they were not challenging
enough. The PEA study found that some schools “watered down” their curriculums because
teachers did not believe students could meet the higher standards.52
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The Board of Education did finally approve the report on teacher assignments in late
February of 1957, but with a curious disclaimer reserving the “privilege of interpreting the
meaning attached to certain terms and phrases, of further studying and exploring the merits of
specific recommendations and of resolving the administrative problems which necessarily arise
in carrying out any policy for a school system as complex as that of New York City.”53
Therefore, it was difficult to know exactly what the Board was and was not endorsing and what it
was and was not going to try and implement.54 Their equivocal language typified the Board’s
continual effort to appease all sides without taking firm action.
Eventually the Board of Education yielded to the resistance of teacher groups and refused
to implement a plan of voluntary or mandatory rotation. Come September 1957, only a few
teachers volunteered for posts in “subject schools.” In the battle between teacher groups and
civil rights groups, the Board capitulated to teacher groups, even though, as city employees, “the
Board of Education should have had the right to assign them where they were needed.”55
Therefore, predominantly African American and Puerto Rican schools in 1957—as they had
before 1954—still lacked an equitable ratio of tenured teachers to substitutes and the quality of
instruction in many schools continued to suffer. And unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the
Board never addressed the racist attitudes of the Teachers Guild, the JCTO, or the HSTA.
By September of 1957 JHS 258 still had not been integrated and the effort to remedy the
paucity of qualified teachers in majority non-white schools was all but lost. Integration of the
school system was proceeding at a snail’s pace, at best, and many argued that the Board of
Education was failing to integrate the schools at all.56 The patience of black and Puerto Rican
parents, as well as civil rights leaders was all but gone, as the atmosphere of cautious optimism
that existed less than a year earlier57 had evaporated.
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In much of the South, white opposition to Brown had hardened to the point of
crystallization by the end of 1956. In Greensboro, the token integration that had taken place
came to represent more a defeat than a victory, as the support for compliance that existed three
years earlier was unable to triumph.58 The Mississippi state legislature passed a resolution
declaring the Brown decision ‘“invalid, unconstitutional, and of not lawful effect’” by a vote of
136 to 0 while singing Dixie . . . literally.59 And then, of course, there was Little Rock.60
Although the New York City Board of Education never pledged outright defiance of the
Supreme Court decision as in Mississippi or Arkansas, the fact is that by the end of 1957 New
York had not complied. Even with the reports of the Commission on Integration and a relatively
liberal board of education, implementing most of their recommendations was proving
impossible. Staunch commitment to the neighborhood school concept was a major hindrance.
Residential segregation was an even more acute problem.61 Board representatives cited racial
concentration in residential patterns time and again as the biggest obstacle to integrating the
schools.
However, just as big a problem was the Board’s propensity to try and appease all the
parties involved in the integration battle. The Board spent considerable time and energy
portraying itself as an ardent proponent of integration while simultaneously trying to convince
oppositional parent and teacher groups that whatever changes took place would not be too
radical. While establishing the CI and endorsing most of its recommendations, it made vague
just how those recommendations would be used. Those tactics inevitably limited the potential
actions of the Board until it became paralyzed and unable to effect significant change at all. In
trying to satisfy all sides, the Board ultimately satisfied no one. When Superintendent Jansen
retired in 1958, that may have made some happy, but the movement to integrate the schools did
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not necessarily improve, it merely entered a new phase, as would the civil rights movement
nationwide.
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